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  1Abstract 
 
The right to equal treatment, irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and 
place of resident, is an important principle for several health care systems. A reform of the 
Norwegian hospital sector may be used as a relevant experiment for investigating whether 
centralization of ownership and management structures will lead to more equal prioritization 
practices over geographical regions. One concern was variation in waiting times across the 
country. The reform was followed up in subsequent years by some other policy initiatives that 
also aimed at reducing waiting lists. Prioritization practice is measured by a method that takes 
departure in recommended maximum waiting times from medical guidelines. We merge the 
information from the guidelines with individual patient data on actual waiting times. This way we 
can monitor whether each patient in the available register of actual hospital visits has waited 
shorter or longer than what is considered medically acceptable by the guideline. The results 
indicate no equalisation between the five new health regions, but we find evidence of more equal 
prioritization within four of the health regions. Our method of measuring prioritizations allows us 
to analyse how prioritization practice evolved over time after the reform, thus covering some 
further initiatives with the same objective. The results indicate that an observed reduction in 
waiting times after the reform have favoured patients of lower prioritization status, something we 
interpret as  a general worsening of prioritization practices over time. 
  2Introduction 
Waiting lists and not least differences in waiting times are commonly observed problems in 
countries with predominantly public health care systems. There are at least two reasons for 
concern about differences in patients’ waiting times. First it may indicate violation of principles 
of horizontal equity and equal access, which would be politically unacceptable. Secondly, 
variations in waiting times may also be observed across patient groups, potentially in conflict 
with objectives of vertical equity. On the other hand, the reason for the differences may be related 
to differences in interpretation of administrative regulations with less medical consequences. It is 
nevertheless a serious problem, since it makes governance of the hospital sector difficult.  
 
We investigate whether actual waiting times vary geographically and over patient groups as 
measured by their prioritization status in Norway. We argue that the Norwegian health care 
reform of 2002 serves as an intervention that should result in equalization of waiting times and 
prioritization procedures. With this reform, the Norwegian central government took over 
ownership all public hospitals and other specialist care institutions. Previously the hospital sector 
was the responsibility of the county governments. Hospitals were reorganized into five Regional 
Health Authorities, as local enterprises or trusts. Thus, the hospital reform reduced the 
organizational unit for coordination and management to five bodies (as opposed to the 19 
counties), where each body consists of a number of counties.
1 Since the number of organizational 
units is reduced and ownership rights are more concentrated, the reform has provided the central 
government with a more direct steering channel to influence prioritization. Hence we expect 
prioritization practice should be more geographically homogeneous after the reform compared to 
the pre-reform period. Most specifically, this is to be expected through the government issuing 
managing directives to the five regions, whose content when it comes to patient treatment 
  3practices, are equal. The reform has provided the government with an instrument for 
implementing the key objective of equal access and treatment. 
 
In order to compare prioritization between geographical regions and over time, we need a way to 
measure prioritization practice. Here we use a method suggested by Askildsen, Holmås, & 
Kaarboe (2007; 2008). The method takes departure in recommended maximum waiting times 
from medical guidelines. We merge the information from the guidelines with individual patient 
data on actual waiting times. This way we can monitor whether each patient in the available 
register of actual hospital visits has waited shorter or longer than what is considered medically 
acceptable by the guideline.  
 
Waiting lists and a corresponding demand for prioritization procedures among the patients are 
common features of public health care systems where prices are not used for rationing access. 
The management of the waiting lists may be more or less explicit. This raises normative issues 
concerning the basis for reasonable prioritization regulations, and how explicit the procedures 
should be formulated. Gravelle & Siciliani (2008) derive results indicating that it is welfare 
improving to prioritize on observable characteristics. Prioritization of patient groups should be 
governed by how sensitive patients are to length of waiting time, and their costs of waiting. 
Daniels & Sabin (2002) advocate explicit prioritization procedures through their suggested 
principle of ‘accountability for reasonableness’.  
 
Waiting time prioritization has been introduced in different ways in several countries, including 
Sweden, Scotland, Spain, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Denmark and Norway 
(Edwards, 1999; Scottish Executive, 2000; Siciliani & Hurst, 2005). England introduced an 
  4elective surgery waiting time target in 2000 (Appleby, Boyle, Devlin, Harley, Harrison, & 
Thorlby, 2005).  
 
There are few academic studies that have evaluated to which extent actual prioritization is in 
accordance with administrative regulation. Dimakou, David, Devlin, & Appleby (2009) study the 
impact of government targets on the distribution of waiting times in the NHS. They analyze how 
the probability of admission of any given patient vary during the time they wait and find that the 
probability of admission vary over time and that peaks in the probability coincide with targets 
and change when targets change. Arnesen, Erikssen, & Stavem (2002) investigated a relatively 
small sample of Norwegian patients referred to inpatient surgery. They found that access to 
treatment was related to several factors, which were not necessarily reasonable prioritization 
criteria. In this context our paper adds to the literature by using a data set covering all patients, 
and a period with explicit waiting time prioritization governed by an Act on Patients’ Rights.  
 
Although the prioritization regulations may differ from other countries, we will argue that the 
research approach and results are of general interest. First, the paper illustrates the importance of 
individual and diagnosis specific data when investigating prioritization among a heterogeneous 
patient population. Second, the results illustrate that adjustment of prioritization practice and 
waiting times may not be uniformly distributed over a patient population. It is of interest to figure 
out how responses may vary over the patient distribution depending on formulation of 
regulations. Thirdly, administrative reforms aimed at affecting waiting lists and prioritization 
within other regulatory regimes can be evaluated using the same approach. 
 
  5Our results give some reasons for concern. We find no indication of more equal practices among 
the five regional health authorities, rather a slight indication of the opposite. On the other hand, 
we find evidence of more equal prioritization among hospitals within four of five regions. 
Regarding the more normative issue whether prioritization has improved, the results are worrying 
in the sense that an observed reduction in waiting times after the reform seems to have favoured 
patients of lower prioritization status. 
 
Institutional features 
The Norwegian specialised health care sector is predominantly publicly owned, and as of 2002 
organised as state owned enterprises within five (north, mid, west, south, east) regional health 
authorities (RHAs). The RHAs have the responsibility for providing specialist health care to all 
patients within the region. Provision of this health care is organised through health enterprises 
owned and governed by the RHAs. These organizations can also contract with private suppliers 
for providing treatment. This outsourcing is in effect quite small compared to the overall 
treatment activity, and confined to a few diagnoses. Another important feature is the patents’ 
right to free choice of hospital, in effect at a national level as of 2001. Relatively few patients 
have opted for the possibility of receiving treatment outside of the hospitals’ natural catchment 
areas (Vrangbæk, Ostergren, Birk, & Winblad, 2007). 
 
Patients who are referred to the specialist health care sector, have according to the Act on Patients 
Rights and the Priority Regulations the right to an evaluation of their medical condition, and an 
assessment whether this condition is such that it demands a right to treatment within an 
individually fixed waiting time (Ministry of Health and Social Services, 1999; 2003). More 
precisely, all patients may be categorized into one of the following categories: 
  61. Acute care (AC) 
2. Elective treatment, with individual maximum waiting time (elective with) 
3. Elective treatment, without individual maximum waiting time (elective without) 
4. Other health care services that may be demanded 
 
In addition to AC-patients, for whom the health enterprises (hospitals) must deliver health care 
services, it is patients in priority group two (elective with) that comprises the core health care 
demand to be supplied by the public (governmentally owned) health enterprises. But also patients 
in group three (elective without) have the right to treatment. It is only demand from patients in 
group four that are excluded from the mandatory activities of the public health enterprises. 
 
For elective patients, the Priority Regulations detail administrative procedures. It establishes that 
upon referral the assessment of a patient’s conditions must consider  
1.  how serious the condition is (seriousness), 
2.  whether a suitable treatment exists that may improve the patient’s condition (effect of 
treatment), and 
3.  the cost-effectiveness of this treatment.  
 
The allocation of prioritization status to elective patients is formally done in the following way. 
When receiving a referral, within 30 days the hospital has to consider whether the patient belongs 
to group 2 or 3, or whether (s)he should not receive treatment at all. This decision is only based 
on the description of the medical condition given in a referral letter from the primary care 
physician. Each patient is to be considered according to the Priority Regulations. If the patient is 
considered to belong to group 2 (elective with), an individual maximum waiting time is given, 
  7prescribing how long the patient may wait before treatment starts. The registered waiting time is 
measured from referral until the patient meets with a specialist from the hospital. This indicates 
starts of treatment, even though this may include periods of further diagnosing of the patient. If 
waiting time is exceeded, the patient has the right to file a complaint. The hospital is then given a 
short time frame for providing treatment. If treatment is still not given, the patient can choose 
treatment another place, privately, publically or abroad, at the cost of the initial health enterprise.  
 
With the prevailing Act on prioritization and the Priority Regulations, Norway is quite in the 
forefront of formalising patient rights. But implementation of the regulations seems problematic. 
The RHAs have initiated projects for implementing prioritization procedures. The existing 
guidelines developed at the level of the RHAs typically include a description of medical 
conditions, and based on this a recommendation on treatment status, including a maximum 
waiting time when relevant and as outlined above. Regional variation is large and a matter for 
concern. The following table shows, for 2005, the share of elective patients given a maximum 




The share of elective patients who are given an individual right, varies from 32% to 97% among 
the health enterprises. Notice, however, even though we may observe large variations in the share 
of elective patients given an individual right, the actual waiting times between patients with an 
individual right (elective with) and patients without a prescribed maximum waiting time (elective 
without) may not be of a similar magnitude. It might be that there are larger variations in the way 
the regulations are implemented than in the actual pattern of medical treatments. This, however, 
  8is a variation that should be reduced due to a hospital reform that provides more coordinated 
governance regulations. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
In the empirical approach we follow Askildsen et al. (2007) and use recommendations from 
medical guidelines outlined in Health Authority West, documented in Nordheim (2005), to 
analyse prioritization practice.
2 Based on descriptions of medical conditions, this report 
recommends whether a patient should be given an individual right to treatment with or without a 
recommended maximum waiting time. We have received assistance from medical professionals 
to attach ICD10-codes to the medical descriptions in the guidelines. We have then categorized the 
different medical descriptions with corresponding ICD10-codes into five prioritization groups 
based on the recommended maximum waiting times. In the empirical analyses we use data from 
the Norwegian patient register (NPR) for the period 1999 – 2005. The register includes patient 
information such as age, gender, first and secondary diagnosis, ICD10-codes, the actual waiting 
time, patients’ place of resident and hospital of treatment. This way we are able to compare 
recommended waiting times to actual waiting times. 
 
To ensure that there is a one-to-one relationship between the medical guidelines and the ICD10-
codes some patient stays had to be dropped. This follows since the same ICD10-code in some 
cases is attached to several medical conditions, and these conditions may give different maximum 
waiting times. In addition, maximum waiting times are in some cases given with a relatively large 
band (e.g. between 12-30 weeks). These medical conditions are also dropped. The next table 
  9gives an overview over the total number of patient stays and the number of patient stays with an 




Table 2 shows the number of elective in-patient stays at public hospitals during the period 1999-
2005, in total (1 202 733 observations) and for the full sample after dropping codes with 
ambiguous grouping (410 037 observations). Before analysing the data, we had to make some 
further adjustments and exclusions. First, we only included the first hospital stay for each patient 
each year. Second, we dropped patients with missing observations. Third, patients with waiting 
times longer than two years were dropped. Finally, we left out patients within psychiatry (F00-
F99) and also patients within P00-P96. After dropping these observations, we are left with a 
sample of 311 188 observations.  
 
We allocate these patients into five groups according to the recommended maximum waiting 




The next table shows how the patients within the relevant ICD10-chapters are allocated among 




  10In Table 5, comparing the pre-reform period 1999-2001 with the post reform period 2002-2005 
for the five health regions, we report average waiting times and the share of patients with 
excessive waiting times. Except for Health Region North, we find that both average waiting times 
and the proportion of excessive waiting are considerably reduced, with the largest reduction in 
Health Region South. However, both in the pre-reform and the post-reform period there are 
relatively large differences across health regions in the reported measures, indicating that the 




Another important question is whether the hospital reform has led to better prioritization practice. 
Because patients with different diagnoses are allocated into the prioritization groups according to 
recommended maximum waiting time, we expect patients in group one also to experience the 
shortest waiting times, and that patients in group five experience the longest waiting times. If we 
observe that waiting times increase as we move from highest (1) to lowest (5) prioritization 
group, we will conclude that in relative terms the health enterprises prioritize according to the 
administrative regulations of prioritization.  
 
Table 6 shows average waiting times and the proportion of patients with excessive waiting times 
in the five prioritization groups prior to and after the hospital reform of 2002. We have also 
included recommended maximum waiting time in number of days. As expected we find that high 
priority patients wait shorter than low priority patients. However, we see that the average waiting 
times in groups one and two are higher than the recommended maximum waiting times. Group 
four patients wait shorter than maximum recommended waiting time, and during the period 1999-
  112001 group three patients’ average waiting time corresponded to the recommended waiting time. 
Looking at the proportion of patients with excessive waiting times, compared to lower prioritized 
patients, relatively more high priority patients wait longer than prescribed. The results indicate 
that in relative terms, low prioritized patients have a relatively better access to hospitals than high 
priority patients. Furthermore, comparing waiting times and the proportion of patients with 
excessive waiting times in the pre- and post-reform periods, we see that low-priority patients 




In the appendix we give descriptive statistics for other explanatory variables used in the analyses. 
Table A1 compares sample characteristics in the pre- and post-reform period. Most 
characteristics seem to be quite similar in the two time periods, but we notice that number of sub-
diagnosis is higher in the post-reform period. We also see that the proportion of patients treated at 
university hospitals is higher in the post-reform period. Table A2 compares patients in the five 
prioritization groups. As expected we find that number of sub-diagnoses is highest among 
patients in prioritization group 1 and lowest among patients in prioritization group 5. More 
surprisingly, there are large differences in the proportion of males, patients in different age 
groups, patients treated at different types of hospitals, and patients from the different health 
regions between the five prioritization groups.  
 
Summarising, the results from the descriptive statistics indicate that the hospital reform has not 
led to an equalization of prioritization practices, and low priority patients have improved access 
after the reform. However, from Table A1 and A2 we see that several other factors likely to affect 
  12waiting times vary between prioritization groups and over time. If, for example, the average 
patient is more severely ill after than before the reform, we would expect to find shorter waiting 
times after the reform even if the prioritization practice is unchanged. Thus, care should be taken 
in concluding from these descriptive analyses and in the next section we present results from 
multivariate regression analyses where we explicitly control for such factors. 
 
Analytical results 
In the multivariate regression analyses we focus on patients’ actual waiting times and the 
probability that patients wait longer than medically acceptable. The first dependent variable is 
analysed by using a linear random effect panel data model and the second with a random effect 
probit model. The most important explanatory variables in the regressions are the dummy 
variables indicating the priority group and health region to which each patient belongs. In the 
regressions we use priority group 1 and Health Region East as reference groups. This means that 
we compare waiting times and the probability of excessive waiting times for patients in priority 
group 2-5 to patients in priority group 1, and likewise that we compare outcomes for patients 
from health regions  South, West, Mid and North to patients living in Health Region East. In the 
regressions we control for patient case mix; patients’ age, gender, diagnosis (main chapters in 
ICD10), number of sub-diagnoses and whether or not the treatment is surgical, as well as hospital 
type. We further control for hospital specific effects and include a time trend to allow for changes 




  13In Table 7 we provide results from multivariate random effect regressions without isolating a 
reform effect. We find that, controlling for patient case mix and hospital effects, only patients 
living in Health Region West and Mid have waiting times significantly different from patients in 
Health Region East. Although the differences in waiting times are quite high (about 5% longer in 
Health Region West and 10% longer in Health Region Mid), the differences are much smaller 
than one could expect from the numbers reported in Table 1. If we look at differences in the 
probability that patients experience waiting times longer than what is considered medically 
acceptable, we find even smaller differences between the five health regions. These findings 
demonstrate that just looking at the proportion of patients that are allocated an individual right to 
treatment can lead to severe misinterpretations of the actual prioritization practice. 
 
From Table 7 we also notice that high priority patients wait shorter than patients in lower priority 
groups. Patients in priority groups 2 and 3 wait 36% and 92% longer than patients in priority 
group 1, while patients in groups 4 and 5 have waiting times about 89% and 80% longer. Looking 
at the probability of excessive waiting, we find that patients in priority groups 2-4 have a 
significantly lower probability than priority group 1 patients for waiting beyond the medically 
acceptable time limit, and it is furthermore decreasing in lower priority status.  
 
Some of the control variables are of interest on its own merit in this context. We see that the 
oldest patients have shorter waiting time than younger age cohorts. Waiting times decreases in 
number of sub-diagnoses, which may be explained by seriousness of condition, and if so, in 
accordance with prioritization guidelines. An interpretation is thus that within the relatively broad 
prioritization groups, the patients with the most serious conditions are given preference. Patients 
needing surgical treatment wait longer periods, which may not be unreasonable since the patient 
  14group we are considering does not include acute care patients. Waiting time is longer at the larger 
regional hospitals. Importantly, we see that waiting time is reduced over time (time trend). 
Without more specifically being able to pinpoint an exact reason, this indicates that conditions 
during the period of investigation have made it possible to increase treatment intensity. This may 
be due to larger budgets allocated to the hospital sector, higher productivity, or other factors that 
affect decisions to put patients in line for treatment.
3 
 
In the rest of this section we will investigate how prioritization practices have developed across 
health regions and prioritization groups. Our strategy for identifying potential reform effects is to 
study geographical variations in our two dependent variables over time. By including interaction 
variables between health regions and pre- and post-reform dummies in the random effect 
multivariate regressions, we can test whether waiting times and the share of patients with 
excessive waiting times are more homogeneous across the five health regions in the post-reform 
period compared to the pre-reform period. 
 
The results from these regressions are reported in Table 8.
4 In the analyses we use “Health East 
pre reform” as the reference group and thereby compare waiting times and the probability of 
excessive waiting in all regions, before and after the reform, to the corresponding numbers in 
Health Region East before the reform.  
 
We choose to focus on differences in waiting times. From Table 8 we see that the variable 
“Health East post reform” is insignificant. We conclude that waiting times were the same in the 
pre and post reform period in this health region. Before the reform, waiting times in Health 
regions West and Mid were longer than in Health Region East. Thus, with no observed change in 
  15waiting time in Health Region East, the objective of equalization would require a reduction in 
these two regions’ waiting time. Contrary, we see that the relative waiting time has increased in 
both regions. Health Region South has deviated negatively (reduced waiting time) compared to 
Health Region East, while Health Region North has experienced an increase in waiting time that 
almost outweighs the before-reform shorter waiting time.
5 Altogether these results demonstrate 
that the reform effect has been in direction of less equalization of waiting times, and less similar 




The next question we raise is whether prioritization practice has improved. Since the hospital 
reform was not the only reform that took place in this period, it is difficult to isolate the effect of 
the hospital reform on potential improvements in prioritization practice. In this section we 
therefore focus on how prioritizations have changed over time. To analyse this question we 
include interaction variables between priority groups and pre- and post-dummy variables in 
multivariate random effect regression analyses. The relevant results are reported in Table 9; see 
Table A4 for the full set of results. We see that before the reform, patients in priority group 2 
waited 43% longer than patients in group 1, patients in group 3 waited 102% longer, patients in 
group 4 waited 90% longer, while patients in group 5 (those without guaranteed maximum 
waiting time) waited 92% longer. Compared to the differences in the recommended waiting 
times, the differences in actual waiting times seem too small. The coefficient for the variable 
‘priority group 1 post’ implies that the highest prioritized patients waited approximately 12% 
longer for treatment after the reform. For prioritization not to have worsened, also less prioritized 
patients should experience at least similar increase in waiting time. However, with the exception 
  16of patients in priority group 4, the tendency is the opposite. The same is observed by 
investigating probability of excessive waiting. The probability of excessive waiting has actually 
on average increased for the highest prioritized patients while it is reduced for priority group 3 
patients, and remained fairly constant for groups 2 and 4. We conclude that waiting times among 
the five prioritization groups are less dispersed after the reform compared to the period before 




Lastly, we investigate the development in the prioritization practises internally within each health 
authority. We have run similar regressions as reported in Table 8 and 9 for each of the five health 
regions.
6 We find that the hospital reform has led to more equal prioritization practices in all 
except one health region (Health region Mid). On the other hand, prioritization practice has not 
been improved in any health region over this period. 
 
Discussion and concluding remarks 
The results of the analyses do not indicate that centralization of ownership has led to more equal 
prioritization practices across the country. However, there is a tendency for more similar 
prioritization practices within the health authorities. We do not observe an improvement in 
prioritization practices over time, neither among the health regions nor within them, as measured 
by waiting times for patients of different priorities.  
 
  17Lack of equalization of waiting times across the country does indicate that political objectives 
have not been met. Management of the health authorities has in some sense not been sufficiently 
strong or efficient. One lesson to be learned from the Norwegian experiment is thus that 
centralization of ownership is not sufficient to obtain equal access to specialized health care. On 
the other hand, it does seem like management structures may work well within the health regions. 
It is not surprising that it is easier to develop efficient management structures within a region than 
across the country. It is well known that agency costs (like asymmetric information and limited 
commitments between principals and agents) put effective limits for organizational integrations 
that are otherwise beneficial (Williamson, 1985; Olsen, 1996).  
 
If the differences in prioritization practices across the country also imply real differences in 
access to treatment for patients of equal need, there are grounds for considerable concern. 
However, this cannot be confirmed with the data available here, since the observed patterns may 
be due to different reporting practices, and not differences in treatment practises. But the 
tendency for a worsening of prioritization practices may represent more of a real problem, and 
thus of some immediate concern for policy makers.   
 
This study is not designed so as to be able to give a precise answer to what may explain these 
somewhat disturbing results. Average waiting times have in general been reduced over time, 
which is desirable, and this has been a stated political objective during the period in question. 
Health authorities and enterprises may however have been too much concerned with reducing 
average waiting times for each hospital unit. Objectives of reduction in waiting time is more 
easily met by focussing on patient groups that have at the outset long waiting times, since it is 
easer to make larger gains quantitatively in registered waiting times among those patients. This 
  18might indicate that implementing vertical prioritization practices in addition to horizontal 
waiting-time prioritization does not provide unambiguous governing messages. Health care 
providers may then choose to focus on more easily observable horizontal waiting-time targets. If 
this is the case, there is an important lesson to be learned from the Norwegian reform for other 
countries that are considering implementing waiting time prioritization.  
 
The financial situation of the health enterprises may also explain the observed waiting list 
development. The health authorities are financed partly by activity based DRG prices, partly by 
block grants. With activity based finance there are incentives to give treatment to patients where 
the DRG price is relatively high compared to costs. It is possible that this would more frequently 
be the case for patients with diagnoses of lower priority. It will be the purpose of future research 
to look further into to effect of the finance system. 
 
References 
Appleby, J., Boyle, S., Devlin, N., Harley, M., Harrison, A., & Thorlby, R. (2005). Do English 
NHS waiting times targets distort treatment priorities in orthopaedics? Journal of Health 
Service Research Policy 10, 167–172. 
Arnesen, K.E., Erikssen, J., & Stavem, K. (2002). Gender and socioeconomic status as 
determinants of waiting time for inpatient surgery in a system with implicit queue 
management. Health Policy 6, 329–41. 
Askildsen, J.E., Holmås, T.H., & Kaarboe, O. (2007). Prioriteringspraksis før og etter 
sykehusreformen. Rapport i forbindelse med NFRs Resultatevalueringen av 
sykehusreformen. HEB-report 05/07, University of Bergen. [Prioritization in Norwegian 
hospitals. Report in connection with the evaluation of the Norwegian hospital reform]. 
  19Askildsen, J.E., Holmås, T.H., & Kaarboe, O. (2008). Monitoring prioritization in a public health 
sector. HEB-report 13/08, University of Bergen. 
Daniels, N., & Sabin, J.E. (2002). Setting limits fairly – Can we learn to share medical 
resources? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dimakou, S., David, P., Devlin, N., & Appleby, J. (2009). Identifying the impact of government 
targets on waiting times in the NHS. Health Care Management Science, 12, 1-10. 
Edwards, R.T. (1999). Points for pain: waiting list priority scoring systems. British Medical 
Journal, 318, 412-414. 
Gravelle, H., & Siciliani, L.( 2008). Is waiting-time prioritisation welfare improving? Health 
Economics 17, 167-184.  
Hagen, T.P., & Kaarboe, O. (2006). The Norwegian hospital reform of 2002: Central government 
takes over ownership of public hospitals, Health Policy 76, 320-333. 
Magnussen, J., Hagen, T.P., & Kaarboe, O. (2007). Centralized or decentralized? A case study of 
Norwegian hospital reform, Social Science & Medicine 64, 2129-2137. 
Ministry of Health and Social Services (1999). Lov om pasientrettigheter. Innstilling O. nr. 91 
(1998–99). (Patient Rights Act).  
Ministry of Health and Social Services (2003). Endring i lov 2. juli 1999 nr. 63 om 
pasientrettigheter. Besl. O. nr 23 (2003–2004). (Amendment to Patient Rights Act).  
Nordheim, O.F. (2005). Praktisering av prioriteringsforskriften i Helse Vest, Report Helse 
Region Vest. (Introducing priority guidelines in Health region West). 
Olsen, T. (1996). Agency costs and the limits of integration. Rand Journal of Economics, 27(3), 
479-501. 
Siciliani, L., & Hurst, J. (2005). Tackling excessive waiting times for elective surgery: a 
comparison of policies in 12 OECD countries. Health Policy 72, 201-215. 
  20Scottish Executive (2000). Our national health: A plan for action, a plan for change. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Executive.  
Sveri, T. (2005). Prioritering innen spesialisthelsetjenesten – om utarbeiding av faglige veiledere 
for tildeling av rett til nødvendig helsehjelp. (Prioritization within the hospital sector. The 
process of developing medical guidelines.) Report to the Directorate of Health. Report 
Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies. 
Vrangbæk, K., Ostergren K., Birk, H.O., & Winblad, U. (2007). Patients' reactions to hospital 
choice in Norway, Denmark and Sweden. Health Economics, Policy and Law 2, 125-152. 
Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
  21Table 1: Variation in proportion of elective patients with individual maximum waiting time 
  Regional variation  Variation Health Enterprises*  
Health authority East  62  46-86 
Health authority South  59  32-81 
Health authority West  73  56-82 
Health authority Mid  91  85-97 
Health authority North  56  35-77 
* Variations among Health Enterprises within each region in share of patients with individual maximum 
waiting time. 
Source: Norwegian Patient Register (NPR), May-August 2005. 
 
Table 2: The number of stays per ICD10-chapter, total and sample 
  All patient stays  Sample with recommended 
waiting time 
Chapters in ICD-10   Number  of 
obs.  
Percent   Number  of 
obs.   
Percent 
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 
(A00-B99)  
5,445 0,45 684  0,17 
Neoplasms (C00-D48)   203,033  16,88  92,055  22,45 
Diseases of the blood .. (D50-D89)   5,078  0,42  1,903  0,46 
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic 
diseases (E00-E90)  
20,972 1,74  12,523 3,05 
Mental and behavioural disorders (F00-
F99)  
6,533 0,54 535  0,13 
Diseases of the nervous system (G00-G99)   71,245  5,92  17,938  4,37 
Diseases of the eye .. (H00-H59)   29,359  2,44  17,944  4,38 
Diseases of the ear .. (H60-H95)   9,590  0,80  7,092  1,73 
Diseases of the circulatory system (I00-
I99)  
110,234 9,17  23,966  5,84 
Diseases of the respiratory system (J00-
J99)  
77,580 6,45  47,060  11,48 
Diseases of the digestive system (K00-
K93)  
84,634 7,04  30,740 7,50 
Diseases of the skin .. (L00-L99)   17,222  1,43  2,396  0,58 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system 
..(M00-M99)  
186,571 15,51  76,488  18,65 
Diseases of the genitourinary system (N00-
N99)  
107,552 8,94  39,737  9,69 
Pregnancy, .. (O00-O99)  56,397  4,69  8,911  2,17 
Certain conditions originating in the 
perinatal period (P00-P96)  
1,904 0,16 7  0,00 
Congenital malformations, . (Q00-Q99)   28,188  2,34  4,684  1,14 
Symptoms, signs, .. (R00-R99)   34,718  2,89  4,229  1,03 
Injury, poisoning, .. (S00-T98)   52,060  4,33  17,743  4,33 
External causes .. (V0n-Y98)   12  0,00  0  0,00 
Factors influencing health status.. (Z00-
Z99)  
94,406 7,85  3,402  0,83 
Number of observations   1,202,733  100,00  410,037  100,00 
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Table 3: The prioritization groups  
Prioritization group   Recommended maximum waiting time  Number of observations 
1 0-4  weeks  66,828 
2 5-12  weeks  105,416 
3 13-26  weeks  106,879 
4 27-52  weeks  6,042 
5  Elective without right  26,023 
 
Table 4: Number of patients allocated to the different prioritization groups according to the 
ICD10-chapters. Sample analysed. 
Chapter ICD-10   Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5 
Certain infectious and parasitic 
diseases (A00-B99) 
399  - 24  - - 
Neoplasms  (C00-D48)  38,682 22,238 13,010 -  - 
Diseases of the blood.. (D50-D89)  1,315  -  -  -  - 
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic 
diseases (E00-E90) 
8,764  - - - - 
Diseases of the nervous system 
(G00-G99) 
6,206 3,011 -  -  150 
Diseases of the eye.. (H00-H59)  -  -  -  -  13,734 
Diseases of the ear.. (H60-H95)  -  2,937  -  1,933  - 
Diseases of the circulatory system 
(I00-I99) 
3,616 5,842 3,737 1,776 - 
Diseases of the respiratory system 
(J00-J99) 
200 36,721  88  984 - 
Diseases of the digestive system 
(K00-K93) 
625  15,100  7,573 1,322 - 
Diseases of the skin .. (L00-L99)  -  899  310  -  54 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal 
system ..(M00-M99) 
- 2,817  46,162  - 11,923 
Diseases of the genitourinary system 
(N00-N99) 
3,016  11,102 17,668 -  - 
Pregnancy,  ..  (O00-O99)  903 766 4,052  -  - 
Congenital malformations, . (Q00-
Q99) 
-  2,210 1,030 -  - 
Symptoms, signs, .. (R00-R99)  794  1,585  667  -  162 
Injury, poisoning, .. (S00-T98)  -  -  12,539  27  - 
Factors influencing health status.. 
(Z00-Z99)  
2,308 188  19  -  - 
Number of observations   66,828  105,416  106,879  6,042  26,023 
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Table 5: Average waiting times (in days) and the proportion of patients with excessive waiting 
times per health region  
  Average waiting times  Proportion of patients with excessive waiting 
 1999-2001  2002-2005  1999-2001  2002-2005 
Health region East   138.94 (153.25)  119.65 (152.37) 38.19  33.56 
Health region South  149.22 (152.37)  122.55 (152.50) 43.62  36.52 
Health region West  152.46 (159.16)  132.05 (140.39) 44.94  41.26 
Health region Mid  153.08 (157.80)  132.84 (140.82) 43.87  39.00 
Health region North  126.79 (141.20)  124.75 (138.41) 37.16  37.82 






Table 6: Average waiting times (in days) and the proportion of patients with excessive waiting 
times in the prioritization groups. 
  Maximum 
acceptable waiting 
days 
Average waiting times  Proportion of patients with 
excessive waiting 
    1999-2001 2002-2005  1999-2001  2002-2005 
Group 1  28  74.53 (126.22)  74.21 (124.76)  42.00  42.93 
Group 2  84  130.06 (147.34)  112.91 (132.18)  44.38  39.94 
Group 3  182  182.93 (155.34)  156.61 (138.32)  39.10  32.12 
Group 4  365  194.10 (169.59)  194.50 (173.41)  16.62  17.32 
Group 5  -  202.42 (152.95)  167.05 (136.20)  -  - 
Means (standard deviations in parentheses) or proportions of variables. 
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(probability of excessive waiting time). Marginal effects. 
  Log waiting time  Probability of 
excessive waiting 
Male   0.0097
** (0.0045)  0.0095
*** (0.0021) 
Age groups. Reference group: Age 30-66     
Age 80+  -0.1748
*** (0.0072)  -0.0678
*** (0.0034) 
Age 67-80  -0.0788
*** (0.0054)  -0.0339
*** (0.0025) 
Age 15-29  -0.0221
*** (0.0088)  -0.0003 (0.0041) 
Age 0-15  -0.1160
*** (0.0082)  -0.0628
*** (0.0037) 
Number sub-diagnosis   -0.0199
*** (0.0018)  -0.0039
*** (0.0008) 
Surgical   0.2245
*** (0.0053)  0.0509
** (0.0025) 
Health regions. Reference group: Health region East     
Health region South   -0.0122 (0.0115)  -0.0070
* (0.0039) 
Health region West  0.0530
*** (0.0189)  0.0047 (0.0081) 
Health region Mid  0.0988
*** (0.0216)  0.0129 (0.0097) 
Health region North  0.0258 (0.0237)  -0.0204
*** (0.0059) 
Priority groups. Reference group: Priority group 1 (high priority patients) 
Priority group 2  0.3585
*** (0.0075)  -0.1784
*** (0.0033) 
Priority group 3  0.9216
*** (0.0084)  -0.2421
*** (0.0036) 
Priority group 4  0.8949
*** (0.0173)  -0.3496
*** (0.0033) 
Priority group 5  0.8024
*** (0.0140)  - 
Hospital type. Reference group: local hospital 
University hospital  0.3651
*** (0.0957)  0.1187
*** (0.0114) 
Central hospital  0.0485 (0.0665)  -0.0099
** (0.0048) 
Time trend   -0.0402
*** (0.0011)  -0.0168
*** (0.0005) 
Main chapters in ICD10. Reference group: Diseases of the circulatory system (I00-I99) 
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases (A00-B99)  -0.1173
** (0.0551)  -0.0434
* (0.0237) 
Neoplasms (C00-D48)  -0.2222
*** (0.0109)  -0.1374
*** (0.0049) 
Diseases of the blood.. (D50-D89)  0.0863
*** (0.0325)  0.0052 (0.0146) 
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases (E00-E90)  0.7155
*** (0.0162)  0.2113
*** (0.0076) 
Diseases of the nervous system (G00-G99)  0.9559
*** (0.0155)  0.3000
*** (0.0069) 
Diseases of the eye.. (H00-H59)  0.7806
*** (0.0193) - 
Diseases of the ear.. (H60-H95)  1.2165
*** (0.0197)  0.3949
*** (0.0075) 
Diseases of the respiratory system (J00-J99)  1.0563
*** (0.0131)  0.3616
*** (0.0058) 
Diseases of the digestive system (K00-K93)  0.5808
*** (0.0121) 0.1982
*** (0.0060) 
Diseases of the skin.. (L00-L99)  -0.1580
*** (0.0330)  -0.0736
*** (0.0152) 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system ..(M00-M99)  0.9084
*** (0.0119)  0.3005
*** (0.0056) 
Diseases of the genitourinary system (N00-N99)  0.6630
*** (0.0118)  0.2041
*** (0.0057) 
Pregnancy,.. (O00-O99)  0.3929
*** (0.0185)  0.2594
*** (0.0081) 
Congenital malformations, . (Q00-Q99)  0.6110
*** (0.0224)  0.1866
*** (0.0104) 
Symptoms, signs, .. (R00-R99)  0.2262
*** (0.0219)  0.0764
*** (0.0108) 
Injury, poisoning, .. (S00-T98)  0.4234
*** (0.0146)  0.1951
*** (0.0070) 
Factors influencing health status.. (Z00-Z99)  0.6206
*** (0.0249)  0.1982
*** (0.0114) 
Constant   83.4962
*** (2.1514)  - 
Number of observations   311188  285165 
Number of hospitals   58  58 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, 
** and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 8. Testing for more equal prioritization practice in the post reform period 
  Log waiting time  Probability of excessive 
waiting 
Health East post reform  -0.0144 (0.0099)  -0.0142
*** (0.0047) 
Health South pre reform  0.0215 (0.0132)  0.0023 (0.0050) 
Health South post reform  -0.0478
*** (0.0144)  -0.0278
*** (0.0056) 
Health West pre reform  0.0348
* (0.0200)  -0.0162
* (0.0090) 
Health West post reform  0.0558
*** (0.0205)  0.0049 (0.0093) 
Health Mid pre reform  0.0798
*** (0.0227)  -0.0061 (0.0103) 
Health Mid post reform  0.0915
*** (0.0231)  0.0134 (0.0106) 
Health North pre reform  -0.0835
*** (0.0246)  -0.0677
*** (0.0068) 
Health North post reform  0.0673
*** (0.0247)  0.0030 (0.0077) 
Number of observations   311188  285165 
Number of hospitals   58  58 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, 
** and 





Table 9. Testing for improved prioritization practice in the post reform period 
  Log waiting time  Probability of excessive 
waiting 
Priority group 1 post reform  0.1226
*** (0.0110)  0.0602
*** (0.0052) 
Priority group 2 pre reform  0.4341
*** (0.0099)  -0.1442
*** (0.0041) 
Priority group 2 post reform  -0.4296
*** (0.0116)  -0.1392
*** (0.0045) 
Priority group 3 pre reform  1.0190
*** (0.0107)  -0.1837
*** (0.0042) 
Priority group 3 post reform  0.9786
*** (0.0123)  -0.2143
*** (0.0048) 
Priority group 4 pre reform  0.8961
*** (0.0247)  -0.3448
*** (0.0039) 
Priority group 4 post reform  1,0203
*** (0.0228)  -0.3285
*** (0.0044) 
Priority group 5 pre reform  0.9206
*** (0.0171)  - 
Priority group 5 post reform  0.8451
*** (0.0173)  - 
Number of observations   311188  285165 
Number of hospitals   58  58 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, 
** and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix. 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics, before and after the hospital reform 
  Pre-reform period  Post-reform period 
Waiting time  144.22 (153.45)  125.46 (138.44) 
Proportion with excessive waiting times  0.413 0.372 
Male   0.380  0.377 
Age 80+  0.107  0.113 
Age 67-80  0.242  0.231 
Age 30-66  0.437  0.456 
Age 15-29  0.078  0.075 
Age 0-15  0.136  0.125 
Number sub-diagnosis   0.715 (1.062)  1.049 (1.339) 
Surgical   0.718  0.712 
Health region East   0.296  0.286 
Health region South   0.242  0.246 
Health region West  0.179  0.211 
Health region Mid  0.145  0.144 
Health region North  0.138  0.114 
Priority group 1  0.204  0.222 
Priority group 2  0.352  0.329 
Priority group 3  0.329  0.354 
Priority group 4  0.019  0.020 
Priority group 5  0.095  0.075 
University hospital  0.221  0.271 
Central hospital  0.388  0.359 
Local hospital  0.391  0.370 
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases (A00-B99)  0.001  0.001 
Neoplasms (C00-D48)  0.237  0.238 
Diseases of the blood.. (D50-D89)  0.004  0.004 
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases (E00-E90)  0.027  0.029 
Diseases of the nervous system (G00-G99)  0.027  0.032 
Diseases of the eye .. (H00-H59)  0.057  0.035 
Diseases of the ear .. (H60-H95)  0.015  0.016 
Diseases of the circulatory system (I00-I99)  0.045  0.050 
Diseases of the respiratory system (J00-J99)  0.133  0.114 
Diseases of the digestive system (K00-K93)  0.082  0.077 
Diseases of the skin .. (L00-L99)  0.004  0.004 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system ..(M00-M99)  0.191  0.199 
Diseases of the genitourinary system (N00-N99)  0.100  0.103 
Pregnancy, .. (O00-O99)  0.012  0.023 
Congenital malformations, . (Q00-Q99)  0.010  0.011 
Symptoms, signs, .. (R00-R99)  0.010  0.011 
Injury, poisoning, .. (S00-T98)  0.038  0.042 
Factors influencing health status.. (Z00-Z99)  0.006  0.010 
Number of observations  130914  180274 
Means (standard deviations in parentheses) or proportions of variables. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics by prioritization groups 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5 










Proportion with excessive 
waiting times 
0.424 0.419 0.349 0.170  - 
Male    0.509 0.392 0.262 0.439 0.454 
Age  80+  0.128 0.062 0.118 0.077 0.238 
Age  67-80  0.294 0.133 0.319 0.131 0.181 
Age  30-66  0.435 0.404 0.501 0.509 0.425 
Age  15-29  0.064 0.130 0.035 0.114 0.055 
Age  0-15  0.080 0.270 0.027 0.170 0.100 










Surgical    0.404 0.764 0.814 0.795 0.882 
Health region East   0.313  0.262  0.315  0.246  0.253 
Health region South   0.234  0.245  0.241  0.250  0.276 
Health  region  West  0.196 0.213 0.179 0.202 0.211 
Health  region  Mid  0.136 0.145 0.150 0.116 0.148 
Health  region  North  0.121 0.135 0.115 0.188 0.112 
University  hospital  0.354 0.271 0.210 0.205 0.224 
Central  hospital  0.298 0.359 0.357 0.401 0.337 
Local  hospital  0.348 0.370 0.433 0.394 0.439 
Number of observations  66828  105416  106879  6042  26023 
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post reform period. 
  Log waiting time  Probability of 
excessive waiting 
Male   0.0098
** (0.0045)  0.0096
*** (0.0021) 
Age groups. Reference group: Age 30-66     
Age 80+  -0.1741
*** (0.0072)  -0.0676
*** (0.0034) 
Age 67-80  -0.0790
*** (0.0054)  -0.0339
*** (0.0025) 
Age 15-29  -0.0218
*** (0.0088)  -0.0001 (0.0041) 
Age 0-15  -0.1163
*** (0.0082)  -0.0628
*** (0.0037) 
Number sub-diagnosis   -0.0202
*** (0.0018)  -0.0040
*** (0.0008) 
Surgical   0.2246
*** (0.0053)  0.0509
*** (0.0025) 
Health regions. Reference group: Health region East     
Health East post reform  -0.0144 (0.0099)  -0.0142
*** (0.0047) 
Health South pre reform  0.0215 (0.0132)  0.0023 (0.0050) 
Health South post reform  -0.0478
*** (0.0144)  -0.0278
*** (0.0056) 
Health West pre reform  0.0348
* (0.0200)  -0.0162
* (0.0090) 
Health West post reform  0.0558
*** (0.0205)  0.0049 (0.0093) 
Health Mid pre reform  0.0798
*** (0.0227)  -0.0061 (0.0103) 
Health Mid post reform  0.0915
*** (0.0231)  0.0134 (0.0106) 
Health North pre reform  -0.0835
*** (0.0246)  -0.0677
*** (0.0068) 
Health North post reform  0.0673
*** (0.0247)  0.0030 (0.0077) 
Priority groups. Reference group: Priority group 1 (high priority patients) 
Priority group 2  0.3584
*** (0.0075)  -0.1785
*** (0.0033) 
Priority group 3  0.9211
*** (0.0084)  -0.2423
*** (0.0036) 
Priority group 4  0.8968
*** (0.0173)  -0.3494
*** (0.0037) 
Priority group 5  0.8019
*** (0.0140)  - 
Hospital type. Reference group: local hospital 
University hospital  0.3691
*** (0.0760)  0.1197
*** (0.0142) 
Central hospital  0.0486 (0.0530)  -0.0085
* (0.0048) 
Time trend   -0.0409
*** (0.0020)  -0.0177
*** (0.0010) 
Main chapters in ICD10. Reference group: Diseases of the circulatory system (I00-I99) 
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases (A00-B99)  -0.1184
** (0.0551)  -0.0438
* (0.0237) 
Neoplasms (C00-D48)  -0.2216
*** (0.0109)  -0.1372
*** (0.0049) 
Diseases of the blood.. (D50-D89)  0.0857
*** (0.0325)  0.0051 (0.0146) 
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases (E00-E90)  0.7159
*** (0.0162)  0.2117
*** (0.0076) 
Diseases of the nervous system (G00-G99)  0.9564
*** (0.0155)  0.3002
*** (0.0069) 
Diseases of the eye .. (H00-H59)  0.7849
*** (0.0193) - 
Diseases of the ear .. (H60-H95)  1.2160
*** (0.0197)  0.3950
*** (0.0076) 
Diseases of the respiratory system (J00-J99)  1.0582
*** (0.0131)  0.3628
*** (0.0058) 
Diseases of the digestive system (K00-K93)  0.5813
*** (0.0121) 0.1988
*** (0.0060) 
Diseases of the skin .. (L00-L99)  -0.1519
*** (0.0330)  -0.0706
*** (0.0153) 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system ..(M00-M99)  0.9090
*** (0.0119)  0.3011
*** (0.0056) 
Diseases of the genitourinary system (N00-N99)  0.6642
*** (0.0118)  0.2047
*** (0.0057) 
Pregnancy, .. (O00-O99)  0.3939
*** (0.0185)  0.2607
*** (0.0081) 
Congenital malformations, . (Q00-Q99)  0.6121
*** (0.0224)  0.1867
*** (0.0104) 
Symptoms, signs, .. (R00-R99)  0.2255
*** (0.0219)  0.0764
*** (0.0108) 
Injury, poisoning, .. (S00-T98)  0.4238
*** (0.0146)  0.1953
*** (0.0070) 
Factors influencing health status.. (Z00-Z99)  0.6201
*** (0.0249)  0.1980
*** (0.0114) 
Constant   84.7967
*** (4.0403)  - 
Number of observations   311188  285165 
Number of hospitals   58  58 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, 
** and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A4: Random effect regression results: Testing for improved prioritization practice in the 
post reform period. 
  Log waiting time  Probability of 
excessive waiting 
Male   0.0103
** (0.0045)  0.0098
*** (0.0021) 
Age groups. Reference group: Age 30-66     
Age 80+  -0.1750
*** (0.0072)  -0.0677
*** (0.0034) 
Age 67-80  -0.0782
*** (0.0054)  -0.0338
*** (0.0025) 
Age 15-29  -0.0228
*** (0.0088)  -0.0008 (0.0041) 
Age 0-15  -0.1164
*** (0.0082)  -0.0631
*** (0.0037) 
Number sub-diagnosis   -0.0209
*** (0.0018)  -0.0042
*** (0.0008) 
Surgical   0.2247
*** (0.0053)  0.0509
*** (0.0025) 
Health regions. Reference group: Health region East     
Health region South   -0.0126 (0.0115)  -0.0070
* (0.0039) 
Health region West  0.0525
*** (0.0189)  0.0050 (0.0082) 
Health region Mid  0.1001
*** (0.0216)  0.0143 (0.0097) 
Health region North  0.0258 (0.0237)  -0.0208
*** (0.0059) 
Priority groups. Reference group: Priority group 1 (high priority patients) 
Priority group 1 post reform  0.1226
*** (0.0110)  0.0602
*** (0.0052) 
Priority group 2 pre reform  0.4341
*** (0.0099)  -0.1442
*** (0.0041) 
Priority group 2 post reform  -0.4296
*** (0.0116)  -0.1392
*** (0.0045) 
Priority group 3 pre reform  1.0190
*** (0.0107)  -0.1837
*** (0.0042) 
Priority group 3 post reform  0.9786
*** (0.0123)  -0.2143
*** (0.0048) 
Priority group 4 pre reform  0.8961
*** (0.0247)  -0.3448
*** (0.0039) 
Priority group 4 post reform  1,0203
*** (0.0228)  -0.3285
*** (0.0044) 
Priority group 5 pre reform  0.9206
*** (0.0171)  - 
Priority group 5 post reform  0.8451
*** (0.0173)  - 
Hospital type. Reference group: local hospital 
University hospital  0.3652
*** (0.0957)  0.1182
*** (0.0122) 
Central hospital  0.0479 (0.0665)  -0.0107
** (0.0048) 
Time trend   -0.0418
*** (0.0020)  -0.0180
*** (0.0010) 
Main chapters in ICD10. Reference group: Diseases of the circulatory system (I00-I99) 
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases (A00-B99)  -0.1166
** (0.0551)  -0.0430
* (0.0237) 
Neoplasms (C00-D48)  -0.2230
*** (0.0109)  -0.1377
*** (0.0049) 
Diseases of the blood.. (D50-D89)  0.0866
*** (0.0325)  0.0055 (0.0146) 
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases (E00-E90)  0.7165
*** (0.0162)  0.2117
*** (0.0076) 
Diseases of the nervous system (G00-G99)  0.9537
*** (0.0155)  0.2992
*** (0.0069) 
Diseases of the eye .. (H00-H59)  0.7678
*** (0.0194) - 
Diseases of the ear .. (H60-H95)  1.2148
*** (0.0197)  0.3938
*** (0.0076) 
Diseases of the respiratory system (J00-J99)  1.0572
*** (0.0131)  0.3623
*** (0.0058) 
Diseases of the digestive system (K00-K93)  0.5800
*** (0.0121) 0.1981
*** (0.0060) 
Diseases of the skin .. (L00-L99)  -0.1576
*** (0.0330)  -0.0733
*** (0.0152) 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system ..(M00-M99)  0.9079
*** (0.0119)  0.3008
*** (0.0056) 
Diseases of the genitourinary system (N00-N99)  0.6632
*** (0.0118)  0.2045
*** (0.0057) 
Pregnancy, .. (O00-O99)  0.3971
*** (0.0185)  0.2629
*** (0.0081) 
Congenital malformations, . (Q00-Q99)  0.6107
*** (0.0224)  0.1857
*** (0.0104) 
Symptoms, signs, .. (R00-R99)  0.2266
*** (0.0219)  0.0770
*** (0.0108) 
Injury, poisoning, .. (S00-T98)  0.4239
*** (0.0146)  0.1961
*** (0.0070) 
Factors influencing health status.. (Z00-Z99)  0.6087
*** (0.0249)  0.1924
*** (0.0115) 
Constant   86.5170
*** (4.0318)  - 
Number of observations   311188  285165 
Number of hospitals   58  58 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, 
** and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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1 Hagen & Kaarboe (2006) and Magnussen, Hagen, & Kaarboe (2007) give more detailed descriptions of the 2002-
hospital reform. 
2 A potential problem is that medical guidelines developed in one health region might be affected by access to 
medical staff and medical equipment (capacity constraints), and that capacity constraints vary systematically among 
regions. Sveri (2005) finds that capacity constraints were not taken into consideration when the maximum waiting 
times were set 
3 We have checked whether there are diagnoses specific effects by running regressions for each diagnosis separately. 
This seems to be the case; however, it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate effects for particular medical 
conditions, leaving this to further research using same procedure. 
4 Table A3 gives the full set of results from these regressions. 
5 Table A3 also presents the random effect probit results. The results show larger differences in the probability of 
excessive waiting times in the post-reform period relative to the pre-reform period 




Phone: +47 55 58 92 00
Telefax: +47 55 58 92 10
http://www.svf.uib.no/econ